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I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
respectfully submits this brief in support of his timely filed notice of

administrative appeal of the September 29, 2020 decision denying him parole.
The facts on this appeal are not in dispute and they demonstrate the Parole Board (the
“Board”) erred in denying Mr.

parole. Mr.

is a 63-year-old man who has

been incarcerated for 31 years—nearly half of his life. He has already served a lengthy term of
incarceration for the crime for which he was convicted. He is not the same man who was
sentenced decades ago to a prison term of 25 years to life. During his incarceration,
Mr.

has demonstrated impressive growth and rehabilitation, evidenced by, among other

things, the positive impact he has had on other inmates in his volunteer roles as a football coach,
Jewish Facilitator and gardener. Throughout his imprisonment, he has thought about the
underlying crime and its grave impact on the victim and her family, including her mother and
son. He feels genuine empathy and remorse for their suffering.
The record is replete with evidence establishing that Mr.

will meaningfully

contribute to society upon his release. The risk assessment tool used by the Board—the
COMPAS Report—shows Mr.

has an overall low risk of committing future crimes if

released. He was given low risk scores for risk of felony violence, arrest risk, abscond risk,
criminal involvement, history of violence, prison misconduct, negative social cognitions, low
self-efficacy/optimism, financial issues upon reentry and employment issues upon reentry.
Exhibit A at 1. Significantly, he has been able to secure guaranteed housing and employment in
the event of his release.
Notwithstanding these facts, on September 29, 2020, the Board denied Mr.
parole for the fourth time. In reaching this decision, the Board committed a number of reversible
errors.
1
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First, the Board failed to meaningfully consider all of the statutorily required factors as
required by 9 NYCRR 8002.2(c) and the United States and the New York Constitutions. Id.;
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016). Instead, the Board’s decision was based
entirely on backward-looking factors that were relevant to Mr.

’s sentence more than

three decades ago, but less so as to the question of his parole today: the nature of the instant
offense, past criminal offenses and charges, and his claim of innocence. As to the other
mandatory factors—including Mr.

’s institutional record, accomplishments, and his

release plan—the Board simply “noted” these factors in perfunctory reference without giving
them any meaningful consideration. This is improper as a matter of law.
Second, the Board’s decision is conclusory, in direct violation of N.Y. Exec. Law § 259i(a), and arbitrary and capricious because the Board recited conclusions that find no support in
the record. The Board failed to even attempt to explain how facts that existed more than three
decades ago outweighed the voluminous evidence of Mr.

’s rehabilitation and

considered release plan, and did not justify its departure from the COMPAS Report that assessed
Mr.

as having an overall low risk of recidivism.
Third, the Board exceeded its authority by substituting its judgment for that of the

sentencing court by effectively deciding that the minimum sentence set by the sentencing court
was not enough. In its decision, the Board could not identify a single improvement that
Mr.

should make to his rehabilitation efforts or release plan so that he could be

released on parole in the future. The Board based its decision solely on factors that existed at the
time of sentencing, which the sentencing court duly considered. But by imposing a longer
sentence than the minimum sentence imposed by the court only on those same factors, the Board
has effectually re-sentenced Mr.

to a higher minimum sentence.

2
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Fourth, the Board relied on a record that contained several pieces of inaccurate
information, each of which warrants reversal. See Matter of Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800, 801
(3rd Dep’t., 2004) (“Inasmuch as the Board relied on incorrect information in denying
petitioner’s request for parole release, the judgment must be reversed and a new hearing
granted.”). During the hearing, the Board discussed criminal charges for which there was no
support and were dismissed, and appears to have relied on inaccurate assessments in
’s otherwise favorable COMPAS Report concerning risk of substance abuse and

Mr.

family support. The Board should not have relied on these inaccurate assessments, which are
contradicted by other facts in the record.
Finally, the Board erroneously found that Mr.

failed to show any remorse—and

could not show remorse—because he is maintaining his innocence on the underlying offense.
The hearing transcript belies this finding. Mr.

explained he is not proud of his past and

the person he was. He added that, while he maintains his innocence, he thinks about the victim’s
family all the time, including her mother and son for whom he has great empathy. The Board
acknowledged that Mr.

got very emotional when speaking about the victim’s family.

For all of these reasons, the Board’s denial of Mr.

’s parole violated New York

State Executive Law, Corrections Law, administrative regulations, and controlling New York
case law. Accordingly, Mr.

seeks reversal of the Board’s decision and immediate

release especially given the unique risks posed by COVID-19 or, in the alternative, a de novo
parole hearing conducted in compliance with controlling law.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr.

is currently incarcerated and under the supervision of the Department of

Corrections and Community Supervision at Bare Hill Correctional Facility (“Bare Hill”). He

3
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was sentenced to indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life for Murder in the Second Degree,
and has served 31 years of his sentence. Exhibit B at 4. He is now 63 years old.
A.

Mr.

Mr.

Achieved Significant Accomplishments While Incarcerated
’s record during his incarceration demonstrates not only that he has

achieved impressive personal growth, but that he has also helped other inmates and has been a
positive influence in the various facilities in which he has been incarcerated.
For over 20 years, Mr.

served as a football coach for other inmates. As a

football coach, he helped bring together men who were part of different gangs to successfully
play for the same team and attain a positive outlook. Exhibit C at 5, 12, 14, 46-47.
Mr.

has received letters from former players thanking him for his service, and as far as

he is aware, all of the men he coached have been successful after release. Id. at 5.
He has also worked as a Jewish Facilitator for many years at various facilities. Id. at 5-6,
12-13. His responsibilities in this role include organizing and leading prayer, services and study
groups; planning holidays and celebrations; and performing other supportive tasks. Id. at 5.
Although Mr.

is not Jewish, serving in this role has helped him bring together people

of different faiths and beliefs, and allowed him to mentor other men. Id. at 6. For example, he
was able to mentor

who Mr.

first met during religious services. Id. Mr.

submitted a letter to the Board in support of Mr.

’s parole application, which

stated, “Our relationship started as a religious support system and our friendship grew from
there…He has had a great impact on me. He is a great influence.” Id. at 21. Mr.
that even since his release, he speaks with Mr.

noted

“two times per week, not counting

letters.” Id.
Mr.

has also worked in the gardens of various facilities, including at Bare Hill.

Id. at 6. Bare Hill’s Garden Supervisor

submitted a letter to the Board, which
4
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stated, “Mr.

’s knowledge and experience in vegetable gardening and greenhouse

management was an asset to the program. Mr.
assignment. Mr.

was timely and productive in this

displayed a positive and respectful attitude toward Staff members and

inmate participants.” Id. at 45.
Mr.

has also successfully completed a number of educational and self-

improvement programs. He obtained his GED, and completed the required programs ART
(Aggression Replacement Training), AVP (Alternative Violence), and Phase II. Id. at 6, 36-38.
B.
Mr.

Mr.

Has Guaranteed Housing And Employment Upon Release
has been able to develop a significant support system for after his release.

Importantly, he has been able to secure guaranteed housing and employment.
If released, Mr.
Mr.

intends to seek a transfer to Rochester, NY where his friend

’s aunt has offered her home to him. Id. at 21. Mr.

also has guaranteed paid

employment as a Recovery Peer Advocate with the Rochester Community Outreach and
Recovery Enhancement Center, which will offer him additional skills and training and
connections to other community agencies. Id. at 28.
If the transfer to Rochester is denied, Mr.

intends to return to Jefferson County,

and has received a letter of assurance from Watertown Urban Mission which will be able to
provide him with support. Id. at 34.
C.

Mr.
’s 2020 COMPAS Report Indicates Low Risk for All Ratings,
Except Where There Were Errors

On July 23, 2020, Bare Hill conducted a risk assessment of Mr.
a COMPAS Report. The COMPAS Report scored Mr.

and completed

as having low risk of felony

violence, arrest risk, abscond risk, criminal involvement, history of violence, and prison
misconduct. Exhibit A at 1. It also scored him as having low risk of negative social cognitions,

5
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low self-efficacy/optimism, financial issues upon reentry, and employment issues upon reentry.
Id.
Mr.

received higher scores for risk of reentry substance abuse and low family

support, but these scores are contradicted by documents in the record.
The COMPAS Report scored him as “probable” for reentry substance abuse. Id. But
numerous documents show Mr.

has never had a substance abuse problem, and does not

have any such problems now. In 2016, the Treatment Plan Review Committee assessed
Mr.

and found that he did not require Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment (ASAT)

because “no evidence suggest[s] a clinical diagnosis for a substance use disorder.” Exhibit C at
58. Moreover, in the prior COMPAS report dated July 27, 2018, Mr.

was given the

lowest score of 1 for risk of reentry substance abuse because, among other things, he did not
undergo “any prior treatments for drug/alcohol abuse and did not indicate any history of failed
drug/UA tests.” Exhibit D at 1, 4. Given that Mr.

has not incurred any disciplinary

infractions, nor has tested positive for any drugs since that 2018 report, there is simply no
evidence to suggest that Mr.

has any substance abuse issues at this time or at any time

in the past. See Exhibit A at 3-4 (noting that Mr.

had no infractions in the past 24

months, including for drugs). The substance abuse risk rating in the most recent COMPAS
Report is, therefore, erroneous.
as “highly probable” for low family

The COMPAS Report also scored Mr.

support. It notes that “[i]t is uncertain as to whether there is evidence of family support.” Id. at
11. But Mr.

’s cousin

stating, “I have known

wrote a support letter to the Board in August 2020,
all my life…we communicated by phone or letters through the

years. … I want to support him emotionally however I can.” Exhibit C at 18. This letter

6
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demonstrates that Mr.

has family support that he can rely on upon his release, contrary

to the assessment that it is “uncertain as to whether there is evidence of family report.” It
appears the COMPAS Report simply failed to take this support into account.
D.

Parole Hearing and Decision

On September 29, 2020, Mr.

appeared before Commissioners Drake and

Mitchell via video conference at Bare Hill. That same day, the Board summarily denied parole
and ordered Mr.
Mr.

to be held for an additional 24 months. Exhibit E at 37-38. This was

’s fourth parole denial. See generally Exhibits E, F. In reaching its decision, the

Board failed to examine the voluminous evidence concerning Mr.

’s rehabilitation and

release plan in any meaningful way, and based its denial almost entirely on backward-looking
factors that existed at the time of his sentencing, and which cannot be changed.
The Board’s decision denied parole based on Mr.

’s instant offense, past

criminal offenses and charges—many of which were dismissed and should not have been
considered—and the unsupported claim that he could not demonstrate remorse because he was
maintaining his innocence despite the fact that he expressed great emotion during the hearing and
stated that he is “not proud of [his] past” and that he thinks about the victim’s family “all the
time” including the victim’s mother and the victim’s son who “had to grow up without a
mother.” Exhibit E at 35-36.
The Board also merely paid lip service to the copious amounts of evidence demonstrating
Mr.

’s rehabilitation and release plan, stating simply that it “notes [his] disciplinary

record and the single disciplinary infraction…program participation to date and the completion
of required programs…results of your COMPAS risk assessment and the low scores indicated
therein, with the exception of highly probable for low family support…[and] well-documented
release plan and support letters.” Id. at 38. The Board did not analyze any of the specific
7
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accomplishments, program completions, or details of the release plan. It also did not examine
how the backward-looking factors weighed against factors that demonstrate Mr.

’s

rehabilitation and readiness for release. Instead, the Board perfunctorily concluded that “there is
a reasonable probability that [Mr.

] would not live and remain at liberty again without

violating the law and that your release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and
would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Id.at 37.
After the parole denial, Mr.

timely submitted his Notice of Appeal of the

Board’s September 29, 2020 decision.
III.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(A) states that release shall be granted if “there is a reasonable

probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the
law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate
the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” In reaching its release
decision, the Board must consider the factors listed in N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A):
(i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interactions with staff and inmates;
(ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release program;
(iii) release plans including community resources, employment, education and training
and support services available to the inmate;
(iv) any deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate while in
the custody of the department and any recommendation regarding deportation made by
the commissioner of the department pursuant to section one hundred forty-seven of the
correction law;
(v) any statement made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s representative,
where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically incapacitated;
(vi) the length of the determinate sentence to which the inmate would be subject had he
or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of the penal law for
8
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a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or article two hundred twenty-one of the
penal law;
(vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, length
of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the
attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation report as well as consideration of any
mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement;
and
(viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to
any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.
New York courts have interpreted the legislature’s grant of administrative discretion in
significant ways.
First, the Board cannot deny release based solely on the nature of the underlying offense.
Rios v. New York State Div. of Parole, 836 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cnty. 2007).
Second, the Board may give different weight to the statutory factors, but must consider—
and rationally weigh—all relevant factors and must not consider erroneous information in doing
so. King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1st Dep’t 1993),
aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 632 N.E.2d 1277 (1994); Johnson v. New York State Div. of Parole, 884
N.Y.S.2d 545 (4th Dep’t. 2009); Thwaites v. New York State Div. of Parole, 934 N.Y.S.2d 797
(Sup. Ct., Orange Cnty. 2011). The Board’s decision must “incorporate risk and needs principles
to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board.” Executive Law 259-c(4).
“If a board determination, denying release, departs from the department risk and needs
assessment’s scores, the board shall specify any scale within the department risk and needs
assessment from which it departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure.” 9
NYCR 8002.2(a).
Third, by statute, the Board must set forth its reasons for denying parole in a written
decision “in detail and not in conclusory terms.” N.Y. Exec. Law 259-i(2)(A); see Mitchell v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 871 N.Y.S.2d 688 (2d Dept. 2009). If the Board does not grant
9
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parole, it must provide written documentation of its reasons for reaching that decision. “Reasons
for the denial of parole release shall be given in detail, and shall, in factually individualized and
non-conclusory terms, address how the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors
listed in section 8002.2 of this Part were considered in the individual’s case.” 9 NYCRR 8002.3.
IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Board’s Decision Did Not Reasonably or Meaningfully Consider All
Relevant Factors and Was Virtually All Backward-Looking.

The Board failed to meaningfully consider the statutorily required factors. Executive
Law 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Parole Board to meaningfully review and consider evidence of
rehabilitation and suitability for release. The Parole Board may not deny release solely on the
basis of the seriousness of the offense and in the absence of aggregating factors. Matter of
Mitchell v. NYS Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742, 743 (2d Dep’t 2009); Matter of Freidgood v. NYS
Bd. Of Parole, 22 A.D.3d 950, 951 (3rd Dep’t 2005) (concluding that a parole denial that
ignored factors such as the petitioner’s expressions of remorse and disciplinary record on the
basis that petitioner’s instant offense was violent was “irrational under the circumstances as to
border on impropriety.”). Notably, “a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole.”
Rios, 836 N.Y.S.2d 503. Rather, the Board must consider the dynamic factors of prisoner
development and rehabilitation. Id. Indeed, indications that the parole decision is based
exclusively on the seriousness of the offense will support a finding that the parole denial was “a
foregone conclusion.” Johnson v. N.Y. Bd. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009); see also
King, 190 A.D.2d at 431-332 (noting that failure to weigh all of the relevant factors strongly
suggest that the denial was a “foregone conclusion”); Morris v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. &
Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226, 233, 963 N.Y.S.2d 852, 858 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cnty.
2013) (“When, as here, the Parole Board focuses entirely on the nature of Petitioner’s crime,
10
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there is a strong indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion that does not
comport with statutory requirements.”).
’s rehabilitation and

The record contains copious evidence demonstrating Mr.

suitability for release, none of which was meaningfully considered by the Board.
During the more than three decades of his incarceration, Mr.

has exhibited

ability to take on meaningful responsibilities, which have positively impacted the various
facilities he had been at, as well as other inmates. In his role as a football coach, he was able to
coach other inmates and bring together individuals who were part of different gangs so that they
could work together for collective success. Exhibit C at 5, 12, 14, 46-47. He has also
volunteered as a Jewish Facilitator, and sought to bring together people of different faiths as an
individual who is not Jewish himself. Id. at 5-6, 12-13. In these roles, he was able to mentor
other men. As a football coach, he was able to develop relationships with his players who have
subsequently written to him, expressing thanks to Mr.
an important friendship in Mr.

for his service. He also gained

, whom he met through religious services. Although Mr.

is now released, they still speak to each other twice a week, not including letters, and Mr.
has written to the Board that Mr.
influence.” Id. at 21. Lastly, Mr.

has “had a great impact on me. He is a great
worked as a gardener at several facilities, including

at Bare Hill. According to Bare Hill’s Garden Supervisor Mr.

, “Mr.

’s knowledge

and experience in vegetable gardening and greenhouse management was an asset to the program.
Mr.

was timely and productive in this assignment. Mr.

displayed a positive

and respectful attitude toward Staff members and inmate participants.” Id. at 45. There is no
indication that the Board meaningfully took any of this into consideration.

11

FUSL000149

Mr.

was also able to complete his GED, and the mandatory programs during his

incarceration. He completed ART (Aggression Replacement Training), AVP (Alternative
Violence), and Phase II. Id. at 6, 36-38. This too was only given a perfunctory mention by the
Board.
And importantly, the record contains a considered release plan that includes guaranteed
housing and employment. Mr.
Rochester NY, id. at 21, and Mr.

’s aunt has offered to provide housing to Mr.

in

has awaiting him guaranteed paid employment as a

Recovery Peer Advocate with the Rochester Community Outreach and Recovery Enhancement
Center, which will offer him additional skills and training and connections to other community
agencies, id. at 28. Once again, the Board failed to meaningfully consider this.
Indeed, the Board failed to meaningfully consider any of this highly relevant evidence.
During the hearing, the Board did not do much more than list some of documents included in Mr.
’s parole packet. See Exhibit E at 29:6-18, 31:5-23, 32:14-33:10. And they did not ask
any questions about Mr.

’s experience as a football coach, Jewish Facilitator or

gardener, which are important experiences demonstrating the extent of Mr.

’s

rehabilitation and ability to contribute to society if released. In the decision itself,
Mr.

’s specific accomplishments, specific program participations or completions, and

contents of his release plan were not even mentioned, despite the fact that these were all relevant
to factors that the Board was required to consider under N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i) and
N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(iii). Id. at 37-38.
Instead, the Board’s focus was exclusively backward-looking at facts that existed more
than three decades ago. For most of the parole hearing, the Board questioned Mr.
length about his relationship to the victim and what occurred around the time of the instant

12
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offense. Id. at 2:10-19:14. The remainder of the Board’s questions were nearly all devoted to
his criminal history including criminal charges that were dismissed—which, as discussed below,
should not have been considered. Id. at 19:15-28:6. In fact, the Board’s decision was entirely
based on the nature of the offense that led to Mr.

’s conviction and related factors, such

as his purported criminal history and his continued claim of innocence. Id. at 37-38. In other
words, the Board denied Mr.

parole based on the nature of his crime to the exclusion of

other relevant factors, in abdication of the Board’s responsibilities under applicable law.
Given that the Board failed to meaningfully consider the statutorily required factors and
that a proper application of those factors warrants parole, the Board’s decision should be
reversed.
B.

The Board’s Denial of Parole Is Stated in Conclusory Terms and it Fails to
Properly Explain or Justify its Denial.

The Board also erred in failing to properly explain and justify its denial. When the Board
declines to grant parole, it is required by statute to provide a decision “in writing . . . of the
factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in
conclusory terms.” Executive Law 259-i(2)(a); Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 146 A.D.3d
22 (1st Dep’t 2016); Ramirez v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 707 (2d Dep’t 2014). The Board cannot
“summarily list[] petitioner’s institutional achievements and then den[y] parole with no further
analysis of them.” Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dept. 2016); Ruzas
v. New York State Board of Parole, No. 1456/2016, slip op. at 4 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Oct. 18,
2017) (holding the Board in contempt for conducting defective de novo interview after the Court
set aside the initial decision because “the Board summarily denied [petitioner’s] application
without any explanation other than by reiterating the laundry list of statutory factors. The
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minimal attention, barely lip service, given to these factors and to the COMPAS Assessment
cannot be justified given the amount of time already served.”).
Moreover, Parole regulations require that “[i]f a Board determination, denying release,
departs from the department risk and needs assessment’s scores, the Board shall specify any
scale within the department risk and needs assessment from which it departed and provide an
individualized reason for such departure.” 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a) (emphasis added). The Board’s
failure to provide an individualized reason for departing from the COMPAS Report—or to
otherwise address the first prong of Executive Law 259-i(2)(A)—demonstrates reversible error.
Comfort v. Stanford, 2018/1445 (Sup. Ct., Duchess Cnty, 2018) (finding the Board did not
comply with 8002.2(a) when it failed explain its departure from the lowest possible COMPAS
risk scores of felony violence, arrest, and absconding yet concluded that there was a reasonable
probability the petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law).
In the Board’s decision, the Board merely provided the following boilerplate language:
the “[r]equired statutory factors have been considered together with your institutional
assessment, including discipline and program participation, your risk and needs assessment and
your need for successful reentry into the community.” Exhibit E at 37. It then listed some facts
in the record such as “participation to date and the completion of required programs” and “results
of your Compas risk assessment.” Id. at 38. The Board did not conduct any analysis of any of
the factors demonstrating Mr.

’s rehabilitation and readiness for release, nor did it, in

fact, apply the relevant evidence to the required factors to come to a proper decision. The mere
rote recitation of only some of the evidence before the Board falls far short of what is required to
substantiate a denial of parole.
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The Board also failed to provide any justification for why it was departing from the
COMPAS Report in finding that Mr.

would be at risk of recidivism despite his low

COMPAS Report scores for felony violence, arrest, abscondment, criminal involvement, history
of violence, and prison misconduct, let alone provide “individualized reasons for such departure”
from each of those low scores as 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a) requires.
By failing to provide any analysis of the favorable factors, the Board likewise failed to
explain how the facts that existed more than three decades ago outweigh the evidence
demonstrating that Mr.

would be able to lead a crime-free and productive life now if

released. New York courts have vacated parole denials on exactly this type of failure to explain
how the Board has weighed the statutory factors. See In re McBride v. Evans, 42 Misc.3d 1230A
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty, 2014) (“While the Board discussed petitioner’s positive activities and
accomplishments at the hearing, it then concluded that his release was incompatible with ‘public
safety and welfare.’ The Board gave no analysis as to how or why it reached this conclusion. It
appears to have focused only on petitioner’s past behavior without articulating a rational basis
for reaching its conclusion that his release would be incompatible with the welfare of society at
this time.”); V. Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole, 100865/18 (Sup. Ct., NY Cnty. 2019) (“There is no
explanation why the 25 year old crime outweighed the voluminous evidence that indicates
petitioner would presently be able to lead a quiet and crime-free life in society.”).
Requiring a detailed explanation and justification of the Board’s determination is not
merely a technical requirement. Without a detailed explanation of this determination, and of
how the Board considered the statutory factors in Mr.

’s case, Mr.

is unable to

prepare for future parole hearings. See Greene v. Smith, 52 A.D.2d 292, 294 (4th Dep’t. 1976)
(explaining that “[t]he objective in requiring the board to furnish reasons is to guide and to aid
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the prisoner in his endeavor to return to society as a useful citizen”). This harm is especially
acute here because this was Mr.

’s fourth denial. And unlike in the prior denials, this

instant denial contained no recommendations for what Mr.

could do to be paroled in

the future. Given that the Board’s decision is almost entirely based on the past—on things that
cannot be changed—it is impossible to know what Mr.

can do in the future to

demonstrate that he is ready to be released into society. The only inference that can be drawn
from this record is that the Board will never meaningfully evaluate the full set of relevant
considerations in determining whether Mr.

should be released, thereby converting his

indeterminate sentence into a mandatory life sentence.
The Board’s decision should be reversed for failure to properly explain and justify its
decision.
C.

The Board’s Denial Amounted to an Illegal Resentencing Based on the
Board’s Own Concept of Justice.

The Board’s single-minded focus on facts that existed three decades ago at
Mr.

’s sentencing not only violates the applicable statutes, but also effectively re-

sentences him to a longer minimum sentence—which under the Board’s rational could be a
mandatory life sentence.
New York courts have held that “in focusing exclusively on the petitioner’s crime as a
reason for denying parole” a Parole Board is “in effect, re-sentencing petitioner to a sentence that
excluded any possibility of parole since petitioner is powerless to change his past conduct.”
Rios, 836 N.Y.S.2d 503. “[A]s the Appellate Division has admonished, under similar
circumstances, such ‘re-sentencing’ by the Parole Board ‘reveal[s] a fundamental
misunderstanding of the limitations of administrative power.’” Id. (citing King, 190 A.D.2d at
432). Here, all of the facts on which the Board now bases its denial—the nature of the instant
16
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offense, past criminal offenses and charges, and claim of innocence—were all before
’s sentencing judge. The sentencing judge noted each and every one of these

Mr.

factors in sentencing Mr.

to 25 years to life. Exhibit G at 5-8.

The Board’s focus on facts that existed at the time of sentencing, coupled with a
conclusion that Mr.

has not met the criteria for parole after serving the minimum

number of years of his sentence and may not be reconsidered for parole for another two years,
effectively constitutes a resentencing to a higher minimum sentence. It is further evidence of the
Board’s subjective views that the minimum sentence of 25 years is not enough time to serve for
the offense. But “[t]he role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the
personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine
whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should be released.” King,
190 A.D.2d at 432.
Because the Board effectively re-sentenced Mr.

to a higher minimum sentence,

the decision should be reversed.
D.

The Board’s Decision Relied On Inaccurate Facts
1.

The Board’s Improperly Relied on Dismissed Charges

As discussed above, the Parole Board cannot rely on erroneous information. This
includes criminal charges that were dismissed. Williams v. Travis, 20 A.D.3d 622, 623, 798
N.Y.S.2d 535, 536 (3d Dept. 2005) (“Inasmuch as the criminal history explicitly relied upon by
the Board as one of the factors justifying the 48–month time assessment included charges that
were dismissed, the matter must be remitted to the Board for reconsideration of the appropriate
time assessment without regard for the two dismissed charges”) (citing Kravetz v. New York
State Div. of Parole, 293 A.D.2d 843, 740 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d
610, 749 N.Y.S.2d 2, 778 N.E.2d 553 (2002)).
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Here, the Board explicitly relied on a number of charges, which were all dismissed. At
the hearing, the Board asked a number of questions about 1979 charges of sexual abuse in the
first degree, rape in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment and criminal mischief; 1988 charges
of rape in the third degree, two counts of endangering the welfare of a child and six counts of
sexual abuse in the third degree; and a 1987 domestic violence allegation against Mr.
Exhibit E at 20:9-12; 21:12-15; 25:17-20. As shown by Mr.

.

’s criminal record, none of

these charges or allegations resulted in a conviction. See Exhibit B. As such, the Board was not
permitted to consider these charges or allegations. Williams, 20 A.D.3d at 623.
The Board’s improper consideration of unsubstantiated charges and allegations as part of
Mr.

’s criminal history warrants reversal.
2.

The Board’s Improperly Relied on Erroneous Assessments in the
COMPAS Report

Despite being otherwise very positive, the COMPAS Report contained erroneous
assessments. The Board was not permitted to rely on any erroneous assessments contained in the
COMPAS Report, and thus, their reliance thereof warrants reversal.
First, the COMPAS Report erroneously gave Mr.

a score of “Probable” for the

risk of “ReEntry Substance Abuse” rating. Exhibit A at 1. But this is entirely unsupported by
any facts, and indeed, is contradicted by the documents in the record. The record shows that in
2016, the Treatment Plan Review Committee assessed Mr.

and found that he did not

require Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment (ASAT) because “no evidence suggest[s] a
clinical diagnosis for a substance use disorder.” Exhibit C at 58 (emphasis added). And in the
COMPAS report dated July 27, 2018, Mr.

was given the lowest score of 1 for risk of

reentry substance abuse because, among other things, he did not undergo “any prior treatments
for drug/alcohol abuse and did not indicate any history of failed drug/UA tests.” Exhibit D at 1,
18
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4. Given that Mr.

has not incurred any disciplinary infractions, nor has he tested

positive for any drugs since that 2018 report, there is simply no evidence to suggest that Mr.
has or ever has had any substance abuse issues that would warrant a “probably” rating
stated at the parole hearing, “I don’t

on this risk factor. See Exhibit D at 1, 4. As Mr.

have a problem with drugs, sir. I hate them. I hate them.” Exhibit E at 34:20-21. But the Board
failed to clearly and expressly acknowledge that the COMPAS Report’s assessment of Mr.
’s risk of substance abuse upon reentry was erroneous.1
Second, the COMPAS Report gave Mr.

a “Highly Probable” score on the low

family support rating, a rating that the Board reiterated in its decision. Id. at 38. At the time, this
assessment was based on the assessor’s comment that although Mr.

“indicated that he

believes that other relatives are supportive … [i]t is uncertain as to whether there is evidence of
family support.” See Exhibit A at 11. But Mr.

’s cousin

submitted a

support letter dated August 2020—after the COMPAS Report was prepared—stating that he
“want[s] to support [Mr.

] emotionally however [he] can.” Exhibit C at 18. This letter

was before the Board and belied the COMPAS Report’s finding in this regard. Indeed, because
Mr.

’s letter demonstrates that Mr.

has family support, the COMPAS Report is

erroneous in giving him a “Highly Probable” score on the Low Family Report Scale. At the
hearing, the Board noted Mr.

’s letter and asked Mr.

about his children, who live

a thousand miles away in Florida. But whether or not Mr.

is in regular contact with his

children does not take away from the fact that he has the support of family members such as

At the hearing, the Board responded to Mr.
’s statement that he doesn’t have a problem with drugs by
stating, “Yes. And that’s only reason you would be waived from having the requirement of having to take the
program. There’s no evidence that you have.” Exhibit E at 34:22-24. But it is unclear from this statement whether
the Board accepted Mr.
’s explanation and excluded consideration of the substance abuse rating in the
COMPAS Report as erroneous. The Board never clearly and expressly stated that it would not be taking this
erroneous assessment into consideration, either at the hearing or in its decision.
1
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, which warrants a lower risk score than “Highly Probable” on the low family support

Mr.

rating. The Board erred in this respect as well.
The Board’s reliance on COMPAS Report assessments that are erroneous and
unsupported by the record warrants reversal.
E.

The Board Erroneously Concluded that Mr.
Remorse

Could Not Express

In its decision, the Board stated, “You continued to claim innocence in the instant offense
and, therefore, there could have been no remorse for the crime for which you were convicted and
the family involved.” Exhibit E at 38. But the hearing transcripts squarely demonstrates that
Mr.

expressed deep remorse and empathy.
Although Mr.

maintains his innocence and is seeking to overturn his

conviction— and has throughout his incarceration—he has also expressed deep remorse for the
crimes he did commit in the past, as well as deep sorrow and concern for the victim’s family. At
the hearing, Mr.

stated:

I’m not proud of my past. I’m not proud of it at all. An idiot. I was a
bonehead…I’m not the same person today. …I am not proud of the past. I
can’t change it. … And I think above all that what goes through my body
and mind all the time is the
Family. But it’s not he
Family, it’s really
It’s
was her mother. The
Family. And her son,
he used to climb all over me. They
had to grow up without a mother, like, my son had to grow up without a
dad. I think about that all the time.
Exhibit E at 35:4-36:11. The Board noted that when Mr.

was making this statement,

he “got very emotional.” Id. at 36:13-14.
Where the applicant showed insight and remorse for the victim and the victim’s family,
as here, the Board cannot base its decision on a lack of remorse. Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc.3d
1232(A) (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2010) (finding that the Board’s denial, which was based on the
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petitioner failing to show remorse for the victim or her family and not appearing to understand
the seriousness of his crime, was contradicted by the record).
The Board apparently concluded that Mr.

is incapable of feeling remorse

because he is maintaining his innocence. But the mere fact that Mr.

continues to

maintain innocence for the instant offense—because he maintains he did not commit it—should
not bar him from parole indefinitely, particularly when he continues to feel sorry for what
happened to the victim and her family. Indeed, none of Mr.

’s prior parole denial

decisions indicate that he lacked remorse for the instant offense and for the victim’s family
despite the fact that he maintained his innocence during each of those parole hearings. See
Exhibit F.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Parole Board’s September 29, 2020 denial of parole should

be reversed, and Mr.

should be granted immediate release especially given the unique

risks posed by COVID-19 or, in the alternative, a de novo parole hearing conducted in
compliance with controlling law.
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